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Abstract
Regulatory reforms in the telecommunications sector in Africa and the rest of the world have 
been necessitated by the convergence of information and communication technology industries. 
Given the relative newness of the sector in Africa, information and communication technology 
implementation problems persist. Research in the sector has tended to attribute implementation 
problems to technological issues. While not contesting this, this paper contends that information 
and communication technology implementation in Africa warrants a re-evaluation from the 
perspective of policy making processes. Drawing on two case studies, this paper critically examines 
the licensing policy option as documented in the Kenya Communications Act and as implemented 
by the regulator in Kenya. This analysis is situated within public policy frameworks that highlight 
the function of domestic institutions and patterns of politics as highly critical ﬁlters in policy making, 
thus inﬂuencing actor behaviour and impacting on implementation outcomes in the policy making 
processes. The ﬁndings are that policy making and information and communication technology 
implementation in Kenya are inﬂuenced by institutional/policy arrangements and the contextual 
forces of ideological, political, social and economic interests. This has signiﬁcant implications 
for Kenya, particularly as the study reinforces the call for a critical examination of the policy 
actors and policy choices that govern information and communication technology regulation and 
implementation. The study ﬁndings also have implications for other African countries, in that the 
study questions the viability of such policy choices for creating information/knowledge societies in 
Africa. The analysis in this paper is based on document research and ﬁeldwork, and forms part of 
a wider study on policy options and implementation processes as enacted through the regulation 
of the telecommunications sector in Kenya.
Introduction
This paper argues that information and communication technology (ICT) implementation problems 
could be better understood by analysing the policy process within which ICT is implemented. To 
this end, the ﬁrst section of this paper undertakes an overview of the ICT sector as documented 
in the Kenya Communications Act (KCA). Given that it is impossible to document the entire legal 
context of the KCA in the space of this paper, the purpose of the ﬁrst section is to establish the 
role of the licensing tool in governing the ICT sector. Drawing on the KCA, the paper provides a 
critical analysis of the licensing policy process and explores alternative policy options available 
within regulatory practice. The analysis draws on public policy discourses that have attempted 
to explain problems in policy making from various perspectives: see, for example, stages of the 
policy cycle – Laswell (1956) and Howlett & Ramesh (1995); public choice framework – Downs 
(1967) and Dunleavy (1991); and welfare economics – Jenkins-Smith (1998). The paper concludes 
with a call for ICT policy studies to be undertaken within a public policy framework that seeks to 
explain “how, why and to what effect governments pursue particular courses of action and in-
action” (Heidenheimer et al, 1990: 3).
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The Kenya Communications Act (KCA) 
The Kenya Posts and Telecommunication Corporation (KP&TC) Act was enacted in 1977. It ﬁlled 
the vacuum left by the East African Posts and Telecommunication Act, which was replaced upon 
the collapse of the East African Community. The KP&TC was historically vertically integrated into 
postal services, telecoms services and regulatory functions. As regulator, provider of telecom 
services and owner of the telecommunications infrastructure, the KP&TC locked out competitors. 
The resulting inequity in the sector manifested in exorbitant fees charged to competitors and 
consumers, and limited regulatory oversight from the Government. 
This changed with the enactment of the Kenya Communications Bill, which became law on 15 
February 1999. The KCA is thus the governing document for ICT implementation in Kenya.1 The 
Act brought about ﬁve main structural changes to the ICT sector, in that it:
• repealed the KP&TC Act of 1997;
• separated postal and telecommunications services – establishing the Postal Corporation 
of Kenya as a statutory postal services monopoly, and Telkom Kenya as the network 
owner and service provider with an interim monopoly for five years;
• created a separate regulatory agency, the Communications Commission of Kenya (CCK), 
to regulate both postal and telecom services. Part of its current mandate includes: issuing 
of licences, regulating prices and establishing interconnection principles;
• created a policy team, the National Communications Secretariat (NCS), charged with the 
responsibility of advising government on policy issues; and
• spelled out the road map towards the liberalisation process for the sector.
In addition, the KCA spells out the principles of fair competition, licensing procedures, interconnection, 
frequency management, type approval, numbering, postal and courier services, tariff regulation 
and procedures of enforcement.
Policy objectives 
The overall government objective for the sector was to optimise its contribution to the development 
of the Kenyan economy as a whole by ensuring the availability of “efﬁcient, reliable and affordable 
communication services throughout the country” (Republic of Kenya, ROK, 2001: 2676).
This reasoning was based on international inﬂuence, as well as convergence, and economic and 
social changes, in the sector. Such a view is similar to the views of other developing countries with 
regard to ICT reforms (Cowhey & Klimenko, 2000; Melody, 1999). 
However, two competing principles deﬁned the sectorʼs operation: ﬁrstly, achieving Universal 
Service Obligation (USO) under the United Nations Millennium goals; and secondly, meeting the 
ﬁnancial demands that this declaration entailed. For example, in the area of telephone lines, the 
Government intended to:
1 The interchange from “Telecommunications” to ICT reﬂects the convergence of the sector. This paper therefore uses the 
terms interchangeably. A discussion on this and its relation to the KCA is presented later in this paper.
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• improve penetration in the rural areas from 0.16 lines (in 2001) to five lines per 100 people 
by the year 2015; and
• improve service penetration in the urban areas from four lines (in 2001) to 20 lines per 
100 people by the year 2015 (ROK, 2001).
To achieve the above objectives, a phased approach through a process of liberalisation and 
privatisation was chosen. To this end, two market segments were created: 
• market segments subject to exclusivity, which was given to Telkom Kenya for a period of 
five years (to 30 June 2004); and
• liberalised market segments subject to competition fostered by the licensing of new 
players.2 
The licensing policy
The licensing policy option is based on a bidding process with three stages: pre-qualiﬁcation, 
technical and ﬁnancial evaluation procedure. While the details vary slightly with each applicant, the 
basic components are the same. 
The main components of the three stages are outlined below:
• Pre-qualification stage: This includes evidence of network and financial history in the 
specified sector. For example, a mobile licence application requires evidence of more 
than 250 000 network subscribers and a turnover of at least US$ 100 million. 
• Technical stage: This includes an understanding of pricing and consumer needs, the 
feasibility of the offer (e.g. a detailed description of the proposed architecture of the 
network) and an analysis of the applicantʼs credibility.
• Financial stage: If deemed successful at the technical stage, no “point distinction” is made 
among the applicants and the process then moves to the financial stage where the process 
converts to (what could be termed) an “auction” format, in that the firm that submits the 
highest amount for the licence is automatically made the winner of the process.
Thus, based on the above procedure, the CCK is obliged to grant a licence to an applicant whose 
bid has scored at least 75% based on a scoring matrix at the technical procedure and has offered 
the highest ﬁnancial bid compared to the other technically qualiﬁed applicants. The rules governing 
the operation of the service to be provided by the applicant are then stipulated on the licensing 
document as provided by the CCK.3
While the process for licensing seems clear on paper, its implementation has created controversy 
from the perspective of both applicants and regulator. As a result of such controversy, outcomes 
have not fulﬁlled intended objectives as set out by the KCA and the regulator. As is evident from the 
above overview of the KCA, the licensing policy is an integral part of the KCA and acts as a major 
governance mechanism for the regulator in the sector. The following case studies draw on the KCA 
and provide the grounding for the paperʼs argument.
2 Examples of licences include: Value Added Services, Very Small Aperture Terminal Services, Internet backbone and mobile 
cellular services. See KCA for speciﬁcations of each licence category.
3  There are 13 main rules governing the process including, for example: licence duration, annual rollout obligations and 
USOs.
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Case study: Licensing of Regional Telecommunications Operators
In an attempt to fulﬁl USO, the CCK in 2000 initiated the process of licensing Regional 
Telecommunications Operators (RTOs). This followed a project trial aimed at evaluating the feasibility 
of introducing rural telecom operators. The decision to licence RTOs was justiﬁed by the argument 
that Telkom Kenya at the time held a monopoly on the provision of regional telecommunications 
but needed support if the Government was to meet USO as well as fulﬁl the KCA mandates. The 
RTOs were expected to provide services to seven of the countryʼs eight provinces.4 The licences 
would be granted for 15 years and would be renewable for a further ten years upon their expiration, 
as stipulated in the KCA. The licences would allow for the provision of local exchange basic voice 
services, inter-exchange basic voice services, and regional long-distance basic voice carrier 
services. The licensing process was used to determine issuance of the licence. Eight companies 
each submitted a bid and three winners emerged. 
The three winning applicants committed to investing up to US$ 350 million to provide 299 000 lines 
or build a ﬁxed-line/wireless network matching the size of Kenyaʼs incumbent, Telkomʼs, network in 
similar regions. In addition to the infrastructure investment, the winning bidders agreed to pay the 
Government an upfront licence fee of US$ 37 million. However, in the ensuing four years to date 
(December 2004), operations have not begun. So far, only one of the three bidders has managed, 
after protracted negotiations, to secure a licence to operate in one of the eight regions tendered 
for and, even then, under slightly modiﬁed entry terms (payment of the licence fee in instalments) 
to accommodate the bidderʼs ﬁnancial difﬁculties. While the CCK has not come out openly on the 
issue, it is thought that the application for the licence was based on speculative bidding on the 
part of the bidders – bidding that was not necessarily supported by a commercial evaluation of the 
market.
Case study: The third GSM
In January 2003, the CCK approved the licensing of the third GSM (Global Standard for Mobile)5 
licence to compete with the existing two GSM networks, Safaricom and Celtel.6 Four main reasons 
were cited as justiﬁcation for a third operator:
• The board argued that a large customer base would overstretch the network of the two 
companies (which by the end of 2002 had a combined subscriber base of more than 1.3 
million)7 and therefore compromise USO targets.
• A third GSM was expected to provide a balance in terms of the ongoing expansion of 
services in areas with no coverage.
• With the resulting competition, the new entrant would lower access charges and thus 
create a larger customer base.
• The third operator would raise additional revenue for the Government through licence 
fees and taxes and consequently create more opportunities for employment (Respondent 
#13).8
4  The capital city, Nairobi, was not included on the list of areas to be serviced by the RTOs; Telkom Kenya was expected to 
have continued exclusivity status in this region.
5  Alternatively, Global System for Mobile and, historically, Groupe Speciale Mobile.
6  Formerly known as Kencell, the company changed its name in November 2004. For more details see www.ke.celtel.com/
en/index.html
7  CCK, 2002.
8  This is based on interviews while on ﬁeldwork in Kenya (August 2003-February 2004). Due to conﬁdentiality agreements, 
actual names have been replaced with respondent numbers.
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Such views were also largely supported by local and international advocacy groups, who all saw 
the introduction of a third operator in the market as a means of reducing charges on services 
provided to the public as well as increasing the viability of achieving USO. A key player in the 
process was International Telecommunication Union (ITU) who, in the pre-biddersʼ conference, 
gave a presentation supporting the introduction of the third GSM and noting that the unmet market 
demand for telephony in Kenya was between 4.7 and 9.4 million,9 which would thus enhance both 
qualitative and quantitative demand for economic growth (ITU, 2002).
All pre-qualiﬁed ﬁrms indicated that they would enter partnerships with local ﬁrms (in keeping with 
Government policy through the KCA, which requires that a local ﬁrm be a part shareholder in 
the application), but they were not required at the pre-qualiﬁcation stage to reveal the names of 
their local ﬁrm partners. On 19 September 2003, Econet Wireless Group of South Africa (with the 
Kenya National Federation of Cooperatives and Corporate Africa as local partners) was announced 
winner, after bidding for the licence at a cost of US$ 27 million. The Econet consortium beat Mobile 
Systems International (MSI) Cellular Investment Holding BV of the Netherlands (with Industrial 
Promotion Services Kenya as local partner), which had also qualiﬁed at the technical evaluation 
stage and had made an offer of US$ 11 million for the licence. 
Two issues emerged in the months following the announcement:
• Econet Consortium suffered an acrimonious parting from its key local partner, the Kenya 
National Federation of Cooperatives, which was experiencing problems funding the deal 
(to begin operations, Econet needed to pay the licensing fees of Ksh 2.16 billion, i.e. US$ 
27 million, to the Government). 
• Kenya Telecommunications Investments Group (KTIG),10 one of the consortia that had 
participated in the second leg of the tendering process, moved to court, suing Econet for 
improper conduct and citing lack of transparency and fairness in the tendering process on 
the part of the CCK.
Thus, as in the case of the RTOs, the third GSM has not began operations and continues to face 
both legal and monetary problems.
Analysis
From the above case studies, three main advantages could be argued for using licensing as a 
policy tool:
• In cases where licences are treated as a scarce resource or where there are limitations 
on licences to be granted, the process offers equal opportunities to all those interested 
in securing a licence. This is the case with most telecommunication and broadcasting 
licences, where frequencies and spectrum management issues are dependant not only 
on local availability but on regional and international allocations.
• The licensing process presents a significant opportunity for the Government to earn 
revenue upfront from initial licence fees paid in by the winning bidder. Sums of up to US$ 
55 million (the highest paid in so far for a licence) represent the prospect of a large portion 
of revenue for Government.
• The licensing process creates an orderly manner in which governance can take place.
9  Current statistics from the Kenya Bureau of Statistics estimate the population to have reached 30 million.
10  A partnership between Detecom International GmBH of Germany and Kenya, Swedtel Ab of Sweden and Al Byte 
Information Technology of Kenya.
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However, it is also argued that an applicantʼs capacity to deliver services should be considered 
paramount and licensing allocation should, therefore, be made on the basis of consideration of 
such pertinent issues. The argument put forward here is also supported by Sihanya (2000) in his 
analysis of the licensing procedure in the broadcasting arena in Kenya.
Furthermore, the licensing process when used as a governance mechanism is only applicable 
to the extent to which it is enforceable. In agreeing with this, Wu et al (2004: 227) note that “the 
expenditure and staff time and energy to create and implement a policy that cannot be enforced 
seems misguided, especially given the number of problems inevitably facing the regulator of a 
competitive market”.
Several problems can therefore be cited from the KCA and the case studies presented.
Lengthy process
The licensing process tends to be very lengthy. The ofﬁcial announcement of the third GSM licence 
took place in January 2003 (Nation, 12 January 2003) and was issued by the then Transport Minister, 
John Michuki. The length of the process is seen to originate from the licensing schedule, which 
provides an outlined procedure of close to one year for the completion of the process. However, 
even with an outlined procedure and start dates, both the incumbent mobile operators, Safaricom 
and Celtel, did not begin operations on their scheduled dates. The third GSM is no different, with 
expectations that Econet will begin operations in May or June 2005 as issued in a press statement 
by the company CEO, Masiyiwa (East African Standard, 8 October 2004).
This thus delays the entire sectorʼs progress and has wider implications for development prospects 
in other sectors of the country. In addition, from a market perspective, competition is negated, as the 
publicʼs envisaged savings through purchase of cheaper calls (based on price changes in all three 
companies) is lost. Assuming this to be the case, it also follows that the Governmentʼs expected 
revenue is reduced because licence fee and percentage revenue income from the mobile operator 
would have been factored into the countryʼs operational expenditure and planning. The assumption 
presented here is not far-fetched; political rhetoric during the election process (December 2002) 
centred on the sale of Telkom Kenya, as well as the introduction of the third mobile subscriber.11 
Potential for controversy, subjectivity, litigation and general disruptions
The licensing process is open to controversy, subjectivity, litigation and other forms of disruption. 
For example, in the case of Econet, complaints in the press came both from local advocacy groups 
and from current players in the market who felt that Econet would not meet the sectorʼs demands 
(Nation, 20 February 2004). This is signiﬁcant, as issues of USO were paramount conditions for 
the licence. Econetʼs Chief Executive responded quickly to the furore of complaints regarding the 
ﬁrmʼs ability to provide service, by arguing that Econet expected to secure a third of the market 
within ﬁve years. Econet based this expectation on an assumption of support from Kenyans whom, 
the ﬁrm hoped, would be more inclined to support a largely Kenyan-owned company (Balancing 
Act, 2004).
11  See local newspapers, East African Standard (www.eastandard.net) and Nation (www.nationaudio.com) during the period 
August 2002-January 2003.
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Such controversy could be attributed to the lack of clarity in the technical process with regard 
to how an applicant wins. While the matrix score is a start, it would seem that there need to be 
better methods on the assessment criteria. Given that subjectivity on the part of the assessor is 
unavoidable, those assessing are left with no alternative but to make judgements based on the 
information made available on the application documents. 
This is not a unique case and this kind of problem is common in other government ofﬁces too, 
where applications for tenders and projects are based more on the ability to convince the tender 
team than on any actual proof of the ability to meet the stated criteria. In other words, what takes 
place in the tender assessment process leaves room for preferences; which in turn leaves room for 
controversy. The lack of clarity regarding the application process and the lack of transparency in 
the process on the part of the CCK leave room for litigation.
In licence cancellation or renewal there should be substantial procedural equity. A licence cancellation 
or approval should therefore not take place until the opinions of all parties have been heard and the 
case made satisfactorily in the opinion of all players. For example, in the case of KTIG versus CCK, 
legal experts argued that the technical and ﬁnancial evaluations should have been considered as 
a whole and should have constituted the substance of the suit; it was therefore argued that anyone 
apart from the judge hearing the case could only explore at the risk of committing the offence of 
sub judice (East African Standard, 12 October 2003). Nevertheless, the CCK went ahead and on 
19 August 2004 issued Econet Wireless with a licence to operate. The court case, which has been 
prolonged, was heard again on 6 November 2004. In arguing its case, KTIG has since revealed 
damning evidence that the process was tailormade for Econet Wireless to win the bid. KTIG also 
claims that the CCK went against public procurement procedures by allowing Econet to take part in 
the drafting of the tendering procedure (East African Standard, 6 November 2004). 
The lack of a complaints unit within the ofﬁce of the CCK further exacerbates such problems. 
Public awareness can largely be attributed to the various advocacy groups in the country and 
would indicate the need for an independent unit, where complaints on issues in the sector might be 
raised. Such a unit would receive verbal or written complaints pertaining to any regulatory issues 
that consumers wished to address. A team would then investigate the issue and take appropriate 
steps, depending on the nature and frequency of the complaint. The need for such a service is 
seen as paramount given that regulatory principles are governed by fairness and justice not only 
to the service provider (as is mostly the case) but also to the consumer. For this reason, the CCKʼs 
decision making process should be transparent, timely, fair and predictable. For example, Australia 
currently has an Ombudsman speciﬁcally for the purposes of monitoring the sector. 
In addition, to allowing stakeholder participation, the CCK should provide more open fora for issues 
to be discussed and deliberated. This would enforce procedural equity. One way to do this would 
be to encourage stakeholder participation. In policy making this is known as the Green and White 
paper process. This method was used in South Africa during the e-government policy making 
process. Stakeholders would therefore be drawn from the regulated industry, the government, 
consumers and the general public. The participation envisaged would constitute active involvement 
in the process and not just casual consultations about decisions made. In the United States, 
however, participation has in some instances been achieved through congressional and agency 
hearings during which interest groups and issue networks make presentations. In a number of 
situations, Congress implements the views of the interest group. This approach is also espoused 
by Sabatier (1991) and Weiss (1977), who see policy stakeholders as inﬂuencing the policy idea 
and its subsequent process in the policy domain. 
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The issue of subjectivity raises further questions about the nature and degree of institutional 
independence. Studies in the area of regulatory independence have found regulatory independence 
and the competitive nature of the market to be directly related. Thus, if “liberalization and competition 
are introduced in an environment of inherited monopoly and weak regulation, competitive market 
forces are likely to play an extremely modest role” (Melody, 1997: 95).
In the case of Kenya, the lack of institutional independence in the licensing process attests to the 
political nature of the CCK and its undemocratic past. During the implementation of the reform 
process, the CCK workforce was carved out of the former KP&TC organisation. Thus, in effect, 
KP&TC created the CCK, Telkom Kenya and Postal Services. The implications of this are signiﬁcant, 
if policy is analysed from an implementation point of view. If we accept that implementation is a 
process that involves a “network” or multiplicity of organisations, the question arises as to how 
organisations interact with one another. Two views of interaction have informed this debate: in 
the power and resource dependency view, it is argued that the degree of interaction between 
organisations and individuals is a product of power relationships, in which one organisation/
individual can induce the less powerful to follow its lead. Another view goes that the degree of 
organisational interchange is only of mutual beneﬁt when the degree of shared objectives or shared 
preference are the same (Aldrich, 1972). This can be seen to be true of both the CCK and Telkom 
Kenya, where collegiality is strong, which negatively impacts on the degree to which the CCK can 
regulate Telkom Kenya.
Furthermore, institutional analysis in public policy studies conﬁrms that formal rules, compliance 
procedures and standard operating procedures structure the interactions of individuals by affecting 
the degree of power one set of actors has over policy outcomes, and the way those actors deﬁne 
their own interests (Neville, 2002; Hall, 1986). Complaints from local advocacy groups crying foul 
over the preferential treatment of Telkom Kenya are not far-fetched; again, such complaints can 
be explained in terms of the historical nature of authority in the organisations involved; the heads 
of the CCK, Telkom Kenya, the NCS and the Ministry responsible, are all presidential appointees 
and are thus viewed as having – indeed are even expected to have – afﬁliations to the Government 
in power. Political rhetoric on the sector is therefore common from both the opposition and 
Government, each accusing the other of inﬂuencing the licensing process. This translates to a lack 
of trust on the part of members of the public, who see the CCK as yielding to political forces and 
politicians as making policy choices based on self-interest. 
Speculators with questionable motives
The licensing process often attracts speculators whose intention is not to roll out networks but to 
eventually sell the licence for quick ﬁnancial gains not related to service provision. As has been shown 
above, the lack of due diligence means that applicants can easily get away with providing untrue 
technical jargon; thus, a submitted proposal may not accurately reﬂect the applicantʼs experience. 
Cases of bidders having submitted successful applications only to sell their share to other ﬁrms and 
thus gain from the application process have also been rampant. An example of this is the case of the 
commercial trunked radio operators. In an aim to improve the efﬁciency and frequency utilisation of 
the numerous private 2-way radio operators, the CCK in 2001 embarked on yet another licensing 
process aimed at introducing the migration of the numerous individual 2-way radio networks to 
shared commercial trunked radio networks, on VHF and UHF bands in order to facilitate efﬁciency. 
Unfortunately, none of the winning bidders came forward to pay the over US$ 5 million that had 
been bid as initial licence fees. The regulator blames this behaviour on speculative bidding on the 
part of the applicants (Respondent #14). Such problems seriously call into question the ability of 
the licensing team involved in assessing the tender documents. To ensure accountability, it may be 
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wiser to consider turning the applications over to a corporate governance body for assessment. It 
may also be worthwhile considering getting corporate governance bodies, in the countries in which 
the applicants themselves operate, to participate in the application process.
The type of problem described above would also tend to call into question the regulatorʼs ability to 
enforce rules. While there is substantial literature on how rules should be established to regulate 
ﬁrms in a competitive communications market, there is comparatively little literature on how to 
enforce such rules (see Baldwin & Cave, 1999). This issue of inability to enforce rules is, however, 
not unique to Kenya; it is cited by the Federal Communications Commission as one of the many 
queries they receive from regulators (Wu et al, 2004). The role of monitoring in policy implementation 
studies would suggest the need for a formative evaluation process, in which monitoring is used to 
inform policy makers and stakeholders (Henry, 1991). On the question of monitoring, the CCK, 
respondents provided three main reasons for the lack of good enforcement:
• the lack of actual statistics;
• lack of technical know-how in drafting documents; and 
• lack of equipment and other infrastructural set-ups that are needed to ensure that due 
diligence is maintained (Respondent #10).
The above gaps in the monitoring process might be reduced by various tools such as database 
systems and information packages, which are suggested as effective in ensuring that monitoring 
can take place. Studies in the area of knowledge management in Kenya (Kerretts, 1998) attribute 
the lack of data to the absence of trust, a lack of awareness regarding the potential value of 
gathering statistics and a lack of proper documentation procedures. Implementation studies in 
policy analysis further underscore the fact that the development of performance evaluation must 
be understood in the context of the need to control public ﬁnances and attain higher levels of value 
for money, efﬁciency and effectiveness (Parsons, 1995).
Nonetheless, even if rules are enforced, questions on the extent to which the regulator is able 
to retract on legally binding documents are raised. What does the regulator do in a case where 
it is unable to re-issue a licence based on the no-show of a winning applicant? What options 
do regulators have in such cases? These issues need to be addressed in the Kenyan sector, 
where such cases are rampant. As it stands, the number of licences in the market determines the 
number of new licences that can be issued. While this in itself is a problem, the issue is further 
compounded by the fact that this number includes those applicants not in operation – therefore 
reducing any possibility of enhanced competition in the sector. The suggestion of having a court for 
the communications sector dealing with such issues has yet to be implemented in many countries 
and continues to be a thorn in the ﬂesh of many regulators. This paper suggests that such forms of 
“closed market based licensing” are in need of review. It is suggested that an open market system 
be used in which competition is not limited to the number of applicants. A progressive result using 
this system is evident in the area of Internet access, where the non-limitation of applicants for 
the licence of Internet Service Providers (ISPs) has brought down the unit price of access to the 
Internet.
High financial bids with resulting high service tariffs
The licensing process often leads to very high ﬁnancial bids, which – if paid – give rise to very high 
service tariffs that are deemed necessary to recoup the heavy investments including payment of 
licence fees. This is evidenced by the case of the incumbent mobile operators – Safaricom and 
Celtel – who defend their service charges on the basis of trying to recoup the licensing fees paid 
to the Government.
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In addition, the issue of high fees has been linked to the Governmentʼs need to raise revenue. Policy 
studies note that economic and social forces shape policy outcomes by generating changes in the 
economic or social environment. This in turn necessitates a policy response and may directly also 
inﬂuence the interests/actions of actors in the policy community (Neville, 2002). Those interviewed 
from both the private and government sectors, as well as those involved in writing the tender 
documents, conﬁrmed that the criteria for the tendering process of the third GSM was largely 
inﬂuenced by demands of the new Government, which needed to meet obligations that pertained 
to the new free education policy. Given the potential high sums of money that can be earned from 
this sector, the Governmentʼs expectations on the sale of a licence have been high. However, 
bidding at different times often results in different ﬁnancial offers, which leads, in turn, to uneven 
and inconsistent market entry terms for different players. It is thought that the non-penalisation of 
Econet is due to the quoted amount on the second winning bid (US$ 11 million), which was seen 
as low and would therefore compromise envisaged government revenue.
Legitimising rent-seeking behaviours
It is argued that the Kenyan licensing process could be seen as legitimising rent-seeking behaviours. 
While this has not been fully determined, complaints made by the public would indicate that the 
issue warrants further investigation. If ﬁnancial applications based on an auction process are the 
sole determinants of success, this would seem to negate the licensing procedure, as decisions 
are made based on Governmentʼs expected ﬁnancial gain rather than on the applicantsʼ ability 
to provide services. In Australia, licensing of an applicant is done through an application based 
on the Terms of Reference, with 60% assigned to technical considerations and 40% to ﬁnancial 
considerations. While an applicant has to pass the technical stage to be considered for the ﬁnancial 
stage, the entire process is seen as one entity, rather than as two separate entities as is the case 
in the Kenyan licensing process.
Moreover, it is argued that the licensing process is not appropriate for fully liberalised markets as 
it leads to requests for concessions, which are in conﬂict with liberalisation policies. An example 
of this would be the recent request for a freeze in further licensing till the investor had recouped 
its investments. There are also cases where the existing operators often require/request that 
subsequent new entrants enter the market on similar terms. This requirement cannot be fulﬁlled 
since it is difﬁcult to align entry terms through a bidding process. Indeed, market conditions will 
have changed and even then it is difﬁcult to quantify the value of the market erosion in order to 
factor the same in developing a reserve price.
Drawing on a public choice analytical framework, which is based on a utilitarian philosophy, such 
policy making behaviour as is described above could be explained as follows: individuals (and 
therefore implicitly organisations) involved in policy making are guided by self, rather than by public 
interest (Dunleavy, 1991). Thus, government agencies seek relentlessly to maximise their budgets, 
while politicians are very eager to offer more programmes to win popular support. The result is an 
expanded government with a bureaucracy, pursuing self-interest at the expense of public interest. 
The public choice framework suggests that the aim of policy making would be to reduce government 
involvement and to develop institutions that enable market forces to operate smoothly. 
Licensing as contrary to the trend towards convergence
The licensing issue raises questions about the nature of the actual degree of ICT convergence 
in the sector. As can be seen from the case of the KCA, licensing is split between the various 
sectors; thus, for example, it is necessary to purchase a separate licence (and go through the same 
59 60
process) for both the broadcasting and GSM networks. Such issues may need to be re-examined, 
as there is a growing international trend towards either abolishing the requirements for licensing or 
considering the possibility of convergence (Ypsilanti & Xavier, 1998). This has been necessitated 
by technology development, consumer demands, issues of long term sustainability of telecom 
providers, and the need for optimum utilisation of resources. For example, in Australia there is 
an open licensing system regime for telecommunications with no distinction made on the basis 
of the technology used.12 This is also fast becoming the case in Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development countries, where convergence directives have been issued suggesting 
that a single regulatory framework be formed in place of the separate agencies that once regulated 
broadcasting and information technology. In the Kenyan context, the issue is not ﬁrst and foremost 
that of convergence but of whether the regulatory system itself hinders convergence. And from the 
case study analysis, it can be seen that the legal system in which regulation is implemented is itself 
in need of re-evaluation. Of major concern therefore is that the regulatory barriers constrict the 
materialisation of the potential economic and social beneﬁts of competition and ICT. 
Policy studies attribute ideas about appropriate policy instruments to epistemic communities of 
individuals “with a claim to policy relevant knowledge based on common professional beliefs and 
standards of judgement about common policy concerns” (Rose, 1991: 15-16). It is suggested 
that this is one reason for the fact that the KCA is based on a telecommunications framework 
and not a holistic ICT framework. In his book Technocracy and the politics of expertise, Frank 
Fischer (1990) argues that technocratic domains such as that of the information society tend to be 
dominated by “experts”, who rule the game. This holds true in the case of the Kenyan regulator, 
where the majority of those in the licensing team, as well as the senior people in the organisation, 
are seen to comprise engineering and legal experts. It is thus not surprising to ﬁnd that both the 
Chief Executives (previous and current) of the CCK were lawyers by profession. The ideological 
justiﬁcation for this is seen to come from the Government and public opinion, in terms of which 
legal and engineering experts are assumed to make good regulators due to the technical and 
legal nature of telecommunications. While not contesting their specialised knowledge, it is noted 
that the nature of telecommunications has now come to encompass information, communication 
and technology – and permeates all sectors of the economy. Thus, future policy making processes 
would do well to establish well rounded teams, from all domains of ICT as well as from other 
sectors of the economy. 
It follows that the effective transformation of ICT will be achieved to the degree to which ICT itself 
is applied in all sectors of the economy. It is unfortunate, therefore, that from the outset there has 
been a separation of information, communication and technology licensing issues. While, in Kenya, 
this is currently being addressed through a separate information technology policy directive, it is 
suggested that this move be revisited – with the aim of providing rather an holistic policy that would 
seek to meet the demands and needs of the ICT sector.
The plethora of literature on the usefulness of ICT attests to the need for and importance of 
knowledge workers and a knowledge infrastructure (Mansell and Wehn, 1998; Melody, 1999). Both 
these issues seem to have been completely ignored in the quest to meet the demands of the 
telecommunications reform process in Kenya and other African nations. While questions remain 
regarding whether a single regulatory body should meet these demands, experience in many 
12  For an overview of the Australian telecommunications reform see Albon, Hardin and Dec (1997).
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African countries shows that there would be problems were this not to be the case. This is because 
existing government agencies have already shown their lack of mutual co-ordination, resulting in 
various duplicated policy documents, which in turn has affected performance of the economy.
Finally, in advocating for a re-examination of the licensing process and having made various 
suggestions for each issue, it should be noted that the drive to want to “catch up” with the rest of the 
world in this everchanging ICT market is heightened. Nevertheless, such catching up should not 
be done blindly. The use of case studies from other countries, as well as suggested ideologies and 
frameworks presented in the international arena, ignore the fact that Africaʼs telecommunications 
landscape ﬁrst and foremost lacks access to basic telecommunications services. The implications 
of this are that Africa needs policy whose drive is to meet targets of USO.13 The drive for reform 
should be based on this and not on attempting to follow market oriented models whose sole aim is 
proﬁtability. Indeed, it has been shown that privatisation is not the sole determinant of competitive 
and efﬁcient markets but rather that sound management systems from both the Government 
and the regulator (Melody, 1999) are required if competition and efﬁciency are to be achieved. 
Policy choices that advocate better and wider use of the new technologies should therefore be 
considered. 
Issues of USO and the implementation of a knowledge infrastructure are further heightened by the 
trends in the mobile telecommunications industry, where ﬁgures of use currently exceed ﬁxed-line 
telephony (Marcelle, 2002). A study by Hamilton (2003) questions the role of the mobile telephone 
industry in Africa. Hamiltonʼs excellent analysis, using quantitative and qualitative data, ﬁnds that 
the mobile telephone acts as a complement to – rather than a substitute for – ﬁxed-line telephony. 
Associated with such ﬁndings, therefore, is the fact that new ways of thinking and new forms of 
technology need to be considered in order not only to provide USO, but also to provide access 
to the Internet and to the various Value Added Services that result from this connection. It would 
be wise to revisit deﬁnitions of USO, because currently such deﬁnitions do not include mobile 
telephony.
The implication, for governments and regulators, of this paperʼs ﬁndings is that policy choices 
need to be made from an enlightened and knowledgeable perspective. Governments in developing 
nations need to be wary of rushing to solidify deals with international community agencies and 
private sector organisations. In addition, the global-political nature of the sector has greatly changed, 
giving rise to the non-differentiation of private, international and non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs). Where this is the case, many NGOs are now involved in providing ICT assistance pegged 
to international deals with private sector agencies. Although, in the short term, this might seem 
reasonable, the long term effects are debatable (given the nature of new and changing policies 
such as open standards/software),14 because in most cases governments are then tied to the 
policy option for a given number of years.
Conclusion
Drawing on the above Kenyan case studies, it is evident that policy making is an incremental 
process, which requires several deliberative processes before a conclusion is reached (if, indeed, a 
ﬁnal conclusion can ever be reached). It is therefore necessary to evaluate a policy domain beyond 
the simplistic nature of what is observed as “end results”. The endeavour of this study has been 
13  For a detailed analysis on USO see International Development and Research Centre (IDRC) reports, www.idrc.org.
14  The open software/standards debate is currently ongoing. The European Union leads the debate by recently concluding 
deﬁnitions of open software/standards. See http://europa.eu.int/ida/ and http://ﬂosspols.org/conf/.
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to provide a deeper analysis of the implementation issues in the telecommunication/ICT sector in 
Kenya through a public policy framework. In doing so, the study has shown that implementation 
problems are linked to policy choices made by policy actors in the sector. The wider implications of 
this study for Africa and other developing nations lie in the fact that ICT policy options and decision 
making processes inﬂuence the degree to which a nation can call itself an information/knowledge 
society. In this regard, policy analysts need to move African ICT research away from the current 
predominance of “ICT outcome/output” research to robust, in-depth qualitative work, which begins 
to unpack the complexities of ICT policy making as set out in this article. Such studies may serve 
to enlighten policy makers on the impact and inﬂuence of their ICT policy choices on communities 
as they endeavour to participate in the knowledge/information revolution.
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